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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
HEBER \Y. GLENN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

No. 7952

GIBBONS & REED COMPANY, a
corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND
BRIEF OF AUTHORITIES

The defendant

respectfull~-

petitions the Court for a

rehearing and shows :

STATEMENT
The Court has not applied the correct rules of law to
tht> facts of this case. This appears fr01n the following
quotation frmn the Court':-; decision appearing on page 2:
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"The fact that the defendant did not foresee
the likelihood of such an accident is not controlling
here, for it was warned that there was danger to
the n1en working under the vertical bank. Negligence may be the proximate cause of dmnage even
though the actor was not able to foresee the injury in the precise form in which it occurred, nor
to anticipate the precise damage which would result from his negligence. ~Iountain States T. & T.
Co. v. Consolidated Freightways, ______ Utah ------,
~-±2 P. 2d 563, Furkovich v. Bingham Coal & Lumber Co., 45 Utah 89, 143 P.121, L.R.~-\. 1915B, -l-~(i."
BRIEF OF AUTHORITIES
There are no additional authorities, nor have we
found a single case, until this one, holding a landowner
liable under conditions present here. \Ve respectfully
submit that the Court has given emphasis to selected
excerpts of testimony and then applied inapplicable legal
principles to them. The damage here was not caused hy
a break in the vertical bank, nor hy sloughing or sliding
material. Those are the dangers feared by the witne~~<'~.
The evidence and the photographs depicting the same
show that the bank is still standing.
The thing that caused the damage wa~ the moYPment of the entire mountain. ~o witne~~ testified that
tht> defendant could or should foresee that any of its
activities would cause the mountain to moYe. The trial
court repeatedly called attention to the fad that WP
were not concerned with sloughing or ~lidin.~ material;
that the PYidPJH'P, with re~pect thereto, wa:' not <·ontrollin~
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because the sloughing and sliding 1naterial did not cause
the da1nage. The record is replete with statmnents that
the dangers which were feared by the various witnesses
were frmn the sloughing and sliding rna terials or from
the breaking of the face of the cliff. No one contended
that those dangers were not present. They were not the
cause of the damage here.
By its decision the Court has held that the defendant is liable because it did not reasonably "forsee", what
neither it nor anyone else could foresee- that the entire
mountain would move. Neither this defendant nor anyone else anticipated or could anticipate that this mountain would break away and move. The "danger" that the
Court states that we were warned about, to-wit: the
sloughing and sliding of materials, and the break in the
cliff did not cause the "accident" nor did they cause the
damage. 'Ye could anticipate sloughing and sliding, but
not a breaking away of the entire mountain.
Mr. Spence, one of plaintiff's witnesses, stated (R.

152). "Well gravel is something that sloughs off all the
ti1ne. It sloughs by the air. You take a gravel pit, regardless of whether it is straight up and down, you go
back two weeks after and that same pit that is straight up
and down you will probably see a couple of hundred
tons laying at the bottom. That has sloughed during that
time. It sloughs by the air. Gravel and sand when it hits
the air is always sloughing. It never stops sloughing."
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Contrast this with the testilnony of :Jir. Hyde as to
what actually occurred (R. 68). ··But this went, that
break occurred here and brought the entire mountain
down for, oh I would say, two hundred and twenty yards
anyway, back to the east, the whole mountain came down
there. Not only can1e down there but it covered over this
canyon". * * *

* * * (R. 69) "There \vas natural mountain left up
there but a big part of that mountain just moved like
that."
Also contrast the couple of hundred tons that sloughs
and slides in a gravel pit according to :Mr. Spence, with
what ~Ir. Hyde said actually moved (R. 69). * * * "I
think possibly it was half a million 1naybe three quarters
of a niillion, but half a million anyway. That is just a
guess." (He was speaking of the yards of earth that
actually moved.)
:Jir. Spence also said in answer to a question as to
expected dangers, whether he would expect these to inelude the movement of the whole mountain. "No I don't
expect that. I would be in a very poor position to say I
expected the whole mountain to move" (R. 161).
The cases cited by the Court, Jlountain .'·Nates Tcll'phone and Telegraph ComJuzny r. Consolidatl'd Frci,rJhlu·ays and Fltrkoz;ich v. BintJlwm Coal and LumlJcr Colllpany, have no application here. 'Ve are not here <'OJlsidering the damage that occurred, nor thP injury that
happened. The injury and damage were to the shovel
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of the plaintiff. The thing that we could not foresee was
that which caused the injury and damage. We are not
claiming that we could not foresee the extent or forn1 of
the damage. If we cannot foresee the event that did cause
the da1nage, then "·e should not be held to liability. Newman moved the shovel hack to where he thought it was
safe and where it would have been safe from sloughing
or sliding 1naterial or from a break in the face. We never
attempted to tell him where he should leave the shovel
at the conclusion of the day's work. On the occasion in
question obviously he had moved it to a point where he
and everyone else thought it was perfectly safe. It
would have been safe if an event had not occurred which
no one anticipated or could anticipate. Not even Mr.
Hyde nor any of the plaintiff's witnesses expected anything to occur such as did occur, and to charge us with
liability for not "foreseeing" this event, is to make us an
absolute insurer.
Other expressions of the Court place constructions
upon the record not supported thereby.
For instance the Court says on the first page of its
opinion that ~Ir. Gordon T. Hyde "testified also that a
commercial powder man came out and inspected the bank
and refused to perform any blasting work for the defendant." This statement is apparently made to show
that the defendant'~ operations were so dangerous that
commercial powder men would not undertake them.
rl,hat is not the record. l\Ir. Hyde testified with reference to the::-;e two pmvder men:
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"'Q.

~\.

~\t

that time ~Ir. Keith didn't say that they
said that they were hard rock men and they
didn't know how to blast or had had no experience blasting gravel~
Not to me, no. He just said that those men
looked at the bank and went down. They
wouldn't blast it.

Q. .He didn't tell you
~\.

why~

No." (R. 91)

The reason the commercial men didn't blast was because they had no experience in gravel. However, l\1r.
Hyde's own employees did do the blasting, and no harm
came to them from it.
The Court also says im1nediately following the above
quotation. "Some attempt was made by the defendant
company to raise the shovel operation on the face so that
the digging did not go constantly to the bottom of the pit,
in accordance with a method known as •terracing' the
hill, but the material on the higher level was found to
be unfit for immediate use and would require extra
handling to suit it to the purpose of the supply." The
record is that we began to operate on a second level but
found the material was too fine and did not suit the Fluor
corporation. They wanted more gravely material (R. 36).
There is nothing sinister here. No inference even of
wrongdoing. :Jir. Reed testified without contradiction
that there are many ways of operating a gravel pit, including the u:-:e of a shovel. That is one of the major reasons why the shovel was developed. "rhe purpose for
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\\·hich you wanted the gnn·el after you got it out determined your method of operation (R. -!09). No frmn
:Jir. Hyde we learn that the material secured by terracing ,,·a~ not ~uitable, and frmn :J[r. Reed that our operation \Ya~ one of many recognized suitable operations.
Xow here does it appear that the reason we operated as
we did was because the gravel "\Yould require extra handling if secured by a different n1ethod of operation.
:Jir. ]~eith, who \\·as in charge of the gravel pit for the
defendant~, did say that if you are going to use the material as a fill, as they were here, you use the shovel
because to use a dozer or a line you would have to handle
material twice, which is unnecessary, and not usually
done (R. 365, 366). The terracing or lack of it was not
shown to have been the cause of the disaster.
~lll of that, however, is beside the point in this case
because the only reason that anyone, including l\Ir. Hyde,
ever advocated one method over another was to prevent
sliding frmn the face of the operation. It was not slides
from the face of the operation that caused the damage.
It was the breaking away of the 1nountain, and even l\Ir.
Hyde at several places indicated that no one anticipated
or could foresee what occurred here. At page 68 he said
a rter testifying that the entire 1nountain moved:

"Q. I say, did you expect it to
~\.

happen~

Not to that extent, no."

Even the decision here states the difference without
giving it its proper significance. This Court says: "ApSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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parently, a slide of this proportion was not anticipated
even by .L\Ir. Hyde or the other men who warned of the
possible dangers of the operation, although they did recognize the possibility of dangerous sloughing off of loose
gravel from the face of the pit." By calling the event a
"slide" the Court erroneously puts it in the category of
things \Ye should foresee and against which we were
warned, whereas actually the event was not a slide at all
such as testified to by the witnesses, nor was it anything
like the dangers feared by :Mr. Hyde or any other witne~~
and again~t which we were warned. It was something
no one could foresee and ·concerning which no one warned
us.
On page 2 the Court says that we contend that we
should not be held liable because we could not foresee
the harm or the manner in which it occurred. This statenlent points up the error of the decision herein. \Y e are
not contending and never have intended to contend that
we are not liable because we could not foresee the harm
or the manner in which it occurred. \Ve have already
attempted to point out that what we are contrnding fori:',
that we could not foresee the event that caused the harm.
\Vhat we could not foresee was that the mountain would
break away and no one even attempted to argue that "·p
or anyone else could foresee the actual event or the artual
cause of the damage.
Thi:-; Court also say~ in the same connection on tlw
second pa,!.!Y of the decision, that we contend we are not
liable lwcau~e :-;w·h a slide had not occurred within the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

history of the Gibbons & Reed operations in this area.
Our contention is rnuch broader than that. We contend
that no :such slide had occurred within the knowledge
of any of the witnesses anywhere. The Court states that
~Ir. Hyde testified that he had seen similar slides, but we
subruit he made no such staternent. He had seen sloughing off and slides fron1 the face, but never had he ever
seen the entire rnountain rnove, where between one-half
and three-(1uarters nrillion yards of dirt nwved (R. 69).
The Court says that nir. Hyde also, testified "It's
not unusual if you take the bottonr out. It happens nearly
every time." \Ye respectfully submit the Court's interpretation of this staternent is not born out by the record.
~[r. Hyde did use the language just quoted, but in the
following connection .

.. Q. In all your experience you have never seen
anything like it, have you~
A.

Oh yes, yes, I have seen then1. Not quite the
same, but I have seen it. I have seen it in
Parley's canyon.

Q.

So that you would expect

A.

Yes. Not exactly like that but I have seen the
same cause produce the same effect.

Q.

To that

A.

I don't think as large as that, no.

extent~

Q. Anything like
A.

it~

that~

'V ell, like it yes, on the same lines. No, I
think not, but it is not unusual to have something of that kind happen.
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Q. It is not unusual to have a slide in a gravel
pit, is it~
A. It is not unusual if you take the bottom out,
it happens nearly everytime.
* * *
Q. I say, would you expect it to happen~
A.

Not to that extent, no." (R. 87-89).

This testimony is very different from saying that
what happened here happens nearly every time "you
take the bottom out."
:Mr. Hyde had also testified that we had removed a
wedge which was supposed to have retarded sliding, but
again he said: "that retarded any slipping unless then'
was a terrific pressure directed behind it."

(R. 4-t

Italics added).
Nothing that we did had aroused anxiety or led :\lr.
Hyde to exercise any care for his own equipment, "·hielt
he thought wa:-; perfectly safe because it was 100 feet
away. What he meant by our operation being dangerous,
was to smneone working under it (R. 81-S:q, and ahnost
at the conclusion of his testimony, he frankly repeated:

"Q.

Y?u said there was some danger, you thought
that there was some danger here although you
may not have visualized it wa:-; that gTPat.
that you havp seen this sort of thing <·lt>atlt><l
out at the bottom, that that wa:-; the usual
thing for it to slide.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
In your opinion, could you have an,ticipated
or seen tlza.t the slide caul d haL'e covered up
the full pa.rt of the pit'!
.A.

I didn't expect it to." (R. 112, 113. Italics
added)

X or did the expert when cross exmnined testify as
indica ted by the Court on page :2 of the decision. The
expert, Professor Cook, said that the explosives were not
the contributing cause of this cataclysm, nor did he know
what caused it (R. 225). He also said :

"Q. In order to consider the clay as an important
factor in the break, wouldn't you have to
know how extensive it was~ Where it was,
something about it~
A.

Actually you would and I am expressing it
merely as a theory. I agree. I don't know
what actually caused this break. I say that
the evidence that is there I would suspect, as
a result of the evidence there, that there was
a clay bed underneath this burden. We see a
clay bed. Now that is in about the right position for it to have caused this particular difficulty. And I will tell you one other thing
that you know beyond any question-

Q.

Now, wait a minute, before we leave this.
You don't know where the clay bed is except
where you saw it in this one spot out there~

A.

Well you can see in its position with respect
to the rest of the burden that it was near the
bottmn of the break. It \vas near the bottom
of the 111a terial.
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Q. I say you don't know how extensive it is,
Dr. Cook?
A. That's correct. You can't see into the face.

Q.

So you can't tell without knowing the extent
of the clay bed whether it was a factor or not·?

A.

That's right. You need to know all of those
details.

Q.

That's right, you need to lmow that. And you
don't know that?

A.

That's right, I only suspect that that was
the situation." (R. 223)

With reference to explosives, he said: (R. 225)
"A.

No indeed, I don't believe that the explosives
had anything to do with the break practically,
only a slight mnount. It doesn't have a direct,
it wasn't the direct cause of the breah:.''

'Vith reference to the plaintiff's contributory negligence this Court says the "Plaintiff had no knowledge of
the probable presence of water and wet clay at the base
of the graY<>l" etc. Koone else had any knowledge of tlw
"probable presence of water and wet clay at the ba::w of
the gravel'' a.t the time of this disastr>r. ::\lr.

I~eith 1:-;

undisputed in his answer to the following question:

"Q. All right, take your seat up there again,
please, l\lr. Keith. So that you encountered
the water earlier and a:-; you proreded back
with your work it disappeared?
~\.

Right." (R. 362)
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Glen had all the information that we had. He
1~ an experienced contractor, and everything that \Yas
obvious to us was even nwre obvious to hin1. He was
fearful, he says. \Ye were not. But he did nothing to protect his property. X o different inferences can be drawn
fr01n that. Either the fear was ignored, or he thought
the danger was not pressing. In either case, we are not
more responsible than he is. Everything was open and
apparent, there was nothing concealed. If we are liable,
he is liable. He expressed concern where we felt none.
He didn't even take the trouble to go back to see if
Xe\nnan had renwved the shovel fr01n the, to hin1, obvious danger of the high bank. And he didn't move it
himself because he didn't want to dirty his suit.
CONCLUSION
\Ye respectfully submit that there is nothing whatever in this record to justify a reversal of the trial court.
\Ye were using our own land for lawful purposes in a
lawful and recognized manner. Neither we nor anyone
else had any reason to expect, nor could we possibly
foresee the thing that happened. The trial court should
he affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
SHIRLEY P. JONES
SHIRLEY P. JONES, JR.
Attorneys for Defendant
GIBBONS & REED
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